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Abstract
This analysis examines the long-run demand for the adjusted monetary base in the United States,
1919–1999.  When the “price” of the base is measured by the inverse of the yield on long-term,
high-quality corporate bonds and an appropriate functional form is selected, the quantity of base
money demanded is found to be a stable function “…of a small number of variables.”
§  The authors are, respectively, vice president and economist, and senior vice president and
director of research, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.  An earlier version of this paper was
prepared by the second author for presentation at the 30
th Konstanz Seminar, held to honor Karl
Brunner. We thank Marcela Williams for research assistance and George Fortier for editorial
assistance.  Contact information: Anderson, anderson@stls.frb.org, 314-444-8574; Rasche,
rasche@stls.frb.org, 314-444-8640. Fax: 314-444-8731.
Views expressed are solely the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the Federal Reserve
Bank of St. Louis nor the Federal Reserve System.2
In a fiat-money economy, the price level is anchored by the “outside money,” or monetary
base, provided by the central bank.  In such an economy, the monetary base consists of (1) those
liabilities of the monetary authorities that are used as media of exchange by the nonbank public
(households and firms other than depository institutions) and (2) those liabilities that are used by
depository institutions to settle interbank payments.
1  In most cases, payment in such central-bank
money constitutes final settlement of debts.  To be useful for monetary policy analysis, the
monetary base must be adjusted for the effect that changes in statutory reserve requirements have
on the amount of base money held by banks.  The adjusted monetary base removes such effects.
The resulting series satisfies the conditions, proposed by a number of authors, for a variable to be
a policy index: Up to a linear transformation, the variable must provide a time-invariant,
monotone scale for measuring whether a change in the policy instrument results in a more or less
expansionary policy, with respect to aggregate economic activity.
2  To the best of our knowledge,
the idea of using the adjusted monetary base as an index of the stance of monetary policy dates to
an analysis published in 1961 by Karl Brunner.
3
The Challenge: Does A Stable Demand Relationship Exist?
It is the current “conventional wisdom” among (many) economic scholars that stable, long-
run relationships involving monetary aggregates and economic activity in the United States do
not exist.  John Taylor’s initial exploration in 1987 of interest rate–based monetary policy rules,
for example, grew from a frustration with the apparent instability of U.S. money demand.
4   Later,
Friedman and Kuttner (1992, p. 490) asserted that all extant stable money-demand relationships
from the 1970s are sample specific and “disintegrate when the sample extends into the 1980s.”
                                                     
1 Balbach and Burger (1976).
2 See, for example, Brunner (1969), Blinder and Solow (1976), and Friedman (1990).
3 Brunner (1961).  See also Brunner and Meltzer (1964).
4 Taylor (1985).3
Friedman set down the challenge for researchers:
“What matters is whether it is possible to identify before the event a set of
regularities of sufficient centrality and robustness to provide the qualitative and
quantitative basis for sound policymaking.” (1993, page 152)
“The well-known reason for this dramatic reversal [of fortune] is simply that the
empirical relationships that once connected money growth to the growth of either
income or prices in the United States [during the 1970s] have utterly collapsed.
As Kenneth Kuttner and I have shown (1992), data for the most recent quarter-
century of U.S. experience provide no evidence of any predictive content of
money growth with respect to subsequent movements of either income or
prices—or, for that matter, any other macroeconomic variables commonly taken
to be of interest for purposes of monetary policy.” (1994, page 124)
Despite such skepticism, subsequent research has suggested the existence of some stable
relationships.  Empirical modeling is always beset by compromises and choices, and inauspicious
choices may lead to incorrect inferences.  In the case of money demand, one of these seems to be
the choice of functional form.  Previous studies have demonstrated that Friedman and Kuttner’s
criticism is not robust to the use of reasonable, alternative functional forms.
5  In their work,
Friedman and Kuttner examine only semi-log functional forms, that is, functions that include the
log-levels of real balances and real income and the levels of nominal interest rates.  This
functional form, based on early work by Cagan (1956) and others, is popular because it preserves
linear relationships among the model’s endogenous variables. It is problematic in monetary
policy–oriented empirical research, however, for two reasons.
  First, there is no a priori way to assess its closeness to the true, unknown data–generating
process.  It is essential to test robustness to the choice of functional form.  Below, for the adjusted
monetary base, we show stable long-run relationships using functional forms that include logs
and reciprocals of interest rates.
  Second, the preservation of aggregate portfolio relationships—the major motivation for the
form—may be irrelevant for monetary policy analysis.  The currently most popular model of4
monetary policymaking assumes that policy consists of setting the near-term level of a short-term
interest or exchange rate.
 6  The data–generating process in such models includes three
variables—real output, the inflation rate, and a short-term nominal interest rate—and three
equations: (1) a Hicks aggregate demand curve (equivalent to an IS curve under the assumption
of no wealth effects in consumption and intertemporal separability of utility), (2) a Lucas
expectations–augmented Phillips curve, and (3) a Taylor monetary policy “rule” specifying the
decision process followed to determine the desired level of the target interest rate.  The model is
closed by invoking rational expectations.  In such a model, aggregate portfolio relationships play
no role; hence, there is little motivation to examine only money demand functions that are linear
in interest rates.
If we are to question the appropriateness of Cagan’s semi-logarithmic functional form,
what are the alternatives?  Slightly before Cagan, Latané (1954) proposed an alternative equation
using the reciprocal of a long-term interest rate.  In this analysis, we examine functional forms
containing two nonlinear transformations of interest rates: natural logs and reciprocals (inverses).
A priori, we believe that a specification (functional form) is preferred over other forms if the
implied relationship between monetary–base velocity (or its log) and the interest rate (or its
transformation) is more linear (or less nonlinear).  Why?  Because extrapolation to out–of–sample
experience is more likely to remain valid.  Our criteria for choosing between them are explored
further below.
The Historical Behavior of Monetary Base Velocity
For more than 30 years, the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis has constructed and published
figures on the adjusted monetary base.  Recently, St. Louis Fed has developed historical figures
                                                                                                                                                             
5 For results concerning M1, see Rasche (1987) and Hoffman and Rasche (1996).  For results concerning
M2, see Rasche (1990) and Carlson et.al. (2000).
6  See Taylor (1999) and McCallum (1999).5
for 1919–1935 and constructed new estimates for 1994–1999.
7  This long, consistent time-series
allows us to re-examine the stability of the demand for the adjusted monetary base.
Perhaps the most elementary analysis of the demand for a monetary aggregate, M, is a scatter
plot of its GDP velocity, Y/M, and a nominal interest rate, analogous to Lucas’s (1988) discussion
of M1 demand.  Figure 1 displays, for 1919–1999, such a diagram for the adjusted monetary base.
Annual-average values of the log of monetary–base velocity, ln(Y/M), are plotted against the
vertical axis, and the Aaa corporate bond rate is plotted against the horizontal axis.  The graph has
two striking features: the relatively tight scatter of the points and the apparently highly nonlinear
relationship between the two variables.  Although the tight fit is attractive, we find the
nonlinearity less so.  In addition, when interpreted as a demand curve, the Lucas scatter diagram
suggests that the interest elasticity of money demand is relatively larger at high interest rates and
relatively smaller at low rates.
8  In the absence of knowledge of the true data–generating process,
there is no agreed-upon way to assess, a priori, the reasonableness of this result.  Ceteris paribus,
however, we would prefer a relationship that is more linear and displays an interest-rate elasticity
that is non-increasing in the level of nominal interest rates.
Figure 2 is scatter plot of a constant-elasticity specification: the log of monetary-base
velocity is plotted on the vertical axis and the log of the Aaa bond rate on the horizontal axis.
9
The  relationship is distinctly more linear than that shown in Figure 1 (and, by design, displays a
constant interest elasticity)—but a distinct curvature remains. In Figure 3, the log of monetary-
base velocity is plotted against the inverse of the Aaa bond rate. A striking aspect of this Figure is
that, with the exception of an outlier in 1921 and several outliers during the 1930s, the
relationship is remarkably linear over the 80-year span of the data. Some heteroscedasticity is
                                                     
7 Anderson and Rasche (1999, 2001).
8 The interest-rate semi-elasticity is constant.  The elasticity varies directly (positively) with the level of the
interest rate.
9 The functional form in Figure 2 is comparable to the double-log, constant-elasticity regression
specifications for M1 and M2 in Meltzer (1963) and Chow (1966).6
apparent—at lower interest rates, the points are more widely dispersed than at higher rates—but
there is no evident curvature in the relationship.  This specification satisfies our prior belief that
the interest elasticity should be a decreasing (non-increasing) function of the level of the interest
rate—that is, as firms and households confronted by rising interest rates reduce their holdings of
base money, each successive reduction becomes more difficult.
We do not find the apparent relationship between velocity and the Aaa bond rate surprising.
A number of previous authors have suggested that long–term, rather than short–term, rates are
more appropriate in money demand functions, particularly if longer-run relationships are of
primary interest.
10  Other authors, such as Friedman and Schwartz (1982), have argued that the
entire spectrum of the yield curve should be included because money is held for a number of
reasons, including as a precaution against uncertain future income and expenses. Unfortunately,
attempts in empirical work to include both short- and long-term rates have suffered from severe
parameter instability. Usually, a choice must be made to include either a short– or long–term rate,
but not both.
One might interpret the monetary base held by the public as a zero-coupon government
perpetuity, that is, as a consol. If so, the opportunity cost of holding base money might be well
measured by the yield on long-term corporate bonds with a very low default risk.  In their
comparison of money demand in the United States and the United Kingdom, Friedman and
Schwartz (1982) chose the yield on British consols for the United Kingdom and the yield on long-
term high-grade corporate bonds for the United States, no consol yield being available.
11 In this
respect, we follow Friedman and Schwartz and interpret the bond yield as a reasonable proxy for
a consol yield. Additional support for our choice is provided by a comparison of the Aaa bond
yield with the “American consol” series of Amsler (1984). The insight of Amsler (1984) is that
certain issues of corporate preferred stock may be interpreted as consols after an adjustment for
                                                     
10 See, for example, Hamburger (1977).7
default risk. Amsler examines Pacific Gas and Electric’s 6% cumulative preferred stock, first
issued in 1914, which trades on the American Stock Exchange as PCGA. Under the U.S. tax
code, dividends paid on stock issued by public utilities prior to October 1, 1942, are a deductible
expense for the payer and taxable income for the recipient, similar to bonds.  To estimate the
unobservable yield on a default risk–free Treasury consol, Amsler adjusts the PCGA current yield
for default risk by subtracting two items: the difference between Moody’s Public Utility AAA
Bond Index and Moody’s Long Term Government Bond Index, and the difference between
Moody’s AA Public Utility Bond Index and Moody’s AAA Public Utility Bond Index.  During
her sample period of 1953–1983, the first adjustment varies in size from 20 basis points during
the early 1950s and early 1960s to more than 200 basis points in 1971 and 1974–1975. The
second adjustment is near zero during the early 1950s and 1960s but, during the 1970s, begins a
steady increase to reach 80 to 90 basis points during 1981–1982.  For this analysis, we have
extended Amsler’s series through 1999. The upper panel in Figure 4 shows the current yield on
PCGA, Amsler’s consol yield (plus our extension for 1984–99), and the Aaa corporate bond
yield; the lower panel shows their inverses.
12  The PCGA current yield and the Aaa bond yield
move together closely. The consol yield and the Aaa bond yield have approximately the same
trend except during the late 1960s and early 1970s when the risk premium for AAA utilities
increased sharply over Treasuries.
We conclude from the above analysis that an index of Aaa-rated corporate-bond yields—
which is implicitly adjusted for default risk by the inclusion of only Aaa-rated firms—is, for
studies of monetary-base demand, an adequate measure of the unobservable yield on a Treasury
consol.
                                                                                                                                                             
11 Friedman and Schwartz (1982, p. 500).
12 PG&E’s senior 6% cumulative preferred issue were first issued at $100 in 1914 and split to $25 in 1927.
Virtually all of the 4.2 million shares outstanding were issued prior to 1933.  Table 1 in Amsler (1984)
shows current yields (equal to the annual dividend divided by the market price) as-of the first business day8
Outliers and the Great Depression
A well-formed economic model should fit the data reasonably well during all periods, albeit
perhaps with a small number of necessary intervention and/or dummy variables.  The scatter plot
in Figure 3 suggests three groups of outliers. The first is 1921, a single year that falls outside the
cluster of points. The second group is a “loop” that begins with Great Britain’s departure from the
gold standard in 1931 and ends with 1936’s tentative economic recovery.  The third group is a
loop that begins with the economic slowdown in 1938 and ends with the war-related economic
expansion of 1941.  If our scatter diagram is to be interpreted as a monetary-base demand curve,
what are we to make of these outliers?
There is no clear explanation for the outlier in 1921. The business cycle of 1920–1921 was
one of the sharpest and briefest on record. Bank failures rose tenfold between 1919 and 1921, but
there were neither bank runs nor an apparent loss of confidence by the public in banks that would
have sharply increased holdings of base money.
13 Although monetary policy clearly was
concerned with gold flows, interest rates were not at unusual levels. Friedman and Schwartz
(1963, p. 241) note that the rapid rebound in 1921 makes annual–average income data misleading
as a measure of the economic situation: But is it more leading for income than for the monetary
base?
 To test this hypothesis, we replaced the numerator of the 1921 observation in Figure 3 with
the 1921–1923 average of GNP while retaining the 1921 monetary base as the denominator. This
new point falls within the main scatter of points, albeit at the bottom edge. Nevertheless, we
conclude that we have been unable to uncover any compelling evidence to explain the 1921
outlier.
Unlike 1921, the events of the Great Depression, including a sharp increase in the
demand for currency, are compelling and well known. During the 1930s, systemic,
                                                                                                                                                             
of the quarter from 1953:Q1 to 1983:Q2. We have calculated annual yields as geometric averages of
Amsler’s quarterly yields.
13 Friedman and Schwartz (1963) note that the currency-deposit ratio changed very little during the period.9
nondiversifiable risk in the economy increased sharply. This, in turn, increased the demand for
the monetary base, both as currency and as bank reserves. The increase in perceived risk likely
wasn’t uniform during the decade. It can be argued that up to mid-1931 households believed (or
hoped) that recovery would begin soon.
14 After mid-1931, the economy began its slide into the
abyss and perceptions of default risk on assets other than U.S. government debt likely increased
rapidly. The 1936–1937 recovery likely raised hopes (and earnings) until the economy slowed
into the 1937 recession.
Certainly, the riskiness of investments has fluctuated at other times, but the 1930s are unique
in our sample because the increases collided headlong with the deterioration in household balance
sheets that began in 1930.
 15  The stock market crash, itself, wiped out significant household liquid
wealth.  In addition, deflation led to sharp increases in the real value of household liabilities
because faltering economic activity made it more difficult to service such debts.  The real value
of liabilities, relative to assets, increased sharply. In this environment, both the ability and
willingness of households to bear risk were reduced. In addition, banks increased their holdings
of vault cash as a precaution against bank runs, even though vault cash was not eligible to satisfy
statutory required reserves.
 16
Temin (1976) documents the increase in perceived riskiness of corporate bonds. By
construction, the increase in perceived risk is not measurable from observations of yields on
constant-quality Aaa– and Baa–rated bonds. Temin discusses two other measures. First, down-
ratings of bonds by rating agencies increased sharply, from approximately 1 to 2 percent of the
                                                     
14 Temin (1976) provides a chronology of discussion and opinion in the business and financial press.
15 Mishkin (1978) and Olney (1999)
16 During the Depression, only deposits at Federal Reserve Banks could be used to satisfy statutory reserve
requirements. To the extent that banks, after 1932, held larger stocks of vault cash as a precaution against
bank runs, demand for the monetary base was higher.  Note that these precautionary amounts of bank vault
cash are not included in Board of Governors’ statistics on bank reserves because vault cash was not eligible
to satisfy statutory reserve requirements.  They are, however, included in the Federal Reserve Bank of St.
Louis figures on bank reserves and the monetary base (Anderson and Rasche, 2001).10
outstanding stock in 1929, to 5 percent in 1930, and to 12 percent in 1931 and 1932.
17   Second,
Temin develops a new measure of the increase in the risk premium by comparing the changes in
the spread between Aaa and Baa yields to changes in the spread between Aaa yields and yields on
a fixed-company sample of bonds.  Both measures somewhat more than double between
December 1929 and June 1931.  The former measure increases from 128 basis points during
December 1929 to 300 basis points during June 1931, and the latter increases from 308 to 699
basis points.  Clearly, the perceived riskiness of corporate debt had increased. Temin (1976)
documents that, in many cases, bank runs and failures during 1930 were rational actions by the
public: many banks had suffered bond defaults and were insolvent when the bonds they held were
marked to their market values.
Our hypothesis is that these events during 1930 and 1931 sensitized the public to financial
market problems.  The economic outlook of households and firms, which was guardedly
optimistic during most of 1930, turned sharply pessimistic during the fourth quarter when the
expected recovery failed to appear.  Although some modest return to financial stability was
evident during early 1931, the departure of Great Britain from the gold standard likely shattered
the last confidence in recovery.
The forward-looking variable “down-rating of corporate bonds” was not significant in our
empirical regression models. One reason, perhaps, is that the variable may not be a good measure
of future expectations during the 1930s: the fates of corporations likely deteriorated much faster
than financial analysts could capture it in a bond-rating index.  Our alternative is to assume a
rough type of “perfect foresight” and include in regressions the actual, observed default rate on
investment-grade corporate bonds. Annual new defaults and the default rate (relative to
beginning–of–year outstandings) are shown in Figure 5. The 1930s are clearly unusual, with
                                                     
17 Temin (1976, p. 81, Table 10).  The figures in the text are our calculations from Hickman (1960), which
is the source cited by Temin.  The figures reported in Temin appear to be in error; for details, see the
Appendix.11
respect to both the level of defaults and the speed with which the default rate accelerated. We
report regressions in Table 1 with and without the default rate on corporate bonds.
18
Estimates of linear regressions based on the inverse-rate functional form are shown in Table
1.  In the upper panel, the dependent variable is the log of the GDP velocity of the adjusted
monetary base.  In the lower panel, the velocity specification is relaxed such that the dependent
variable is the log of the deflated adjusted monetary base and real GDP is included as a regressor.
Note that the coefficients on real GDP reported in the lower panel are neither statistically nor
economically different from unity.  As a result, the estimated coefficients on the Aaa bond rate in
the upper and lower panels are approximately the same, equal to –0.03.
The effect of removing the regression-estimated effect of defaults is shown in Figure 6.  In
the figure, “default-adjusted” velocity is calculated by subtracting from monetary-base velocity
the product of the corporate-bond default rate and its estimated regression coefficient.  The
“adjustment” clearly brings the outliers (except 1921) back into the main constellation of points.
After this adjustment, some curvature seems apparent for observations during the bond-pegging
period, 1941–1951 (lower right-hand corner of Figure 6).
As a further check on robustness, Figures 7 and 8 display scatter plots using the yield on
Baa-rated bonds.  Our conclusions are unchanged.  In Figure 7, the same overall linearity and
outliers are evident as in Figure 4; in Figure 8, removing the estimated effect of bond defaults
moves the outliers back into the main constellation of points.  The relationships shown in the
Figures also appear in quarterly data.
                                                     
18 The data on default rates of investment-quality corporate bonds through 1965 are from Hickman (1960)
and Atkinson (1967). These data end in 1965. However, during the 1950s and 1960s the volume of defaults
relative to outstanding corporate debt is extremely small. Since there have been no default epidemics on
investment-grade bonds since that time, we have assumed that the value of the series is zero for all years
since 1965. This assumption is supported by publicly available data from Moody’s Investor Service,
available on Moody’s Internet web site (www.moodys.com).12
Statistical Tests for Functional Form
The above analysis suggests that the inverse-rate functional form is highly consistent with
the data. In this section, we test this hypothesis. In models of money demand, we prefer one
functional form relative to another if it (1) is more nearly linear (perhaps after transformation of
the variables) and (2) displays an interest elasticity that is a decreasing function of the level of
interest rates.
  Extrapolation and counterfactual policy analysis is hazardous at best—nonlinear
functional forms only make it more so.
The compatibility of our preferences regarding functional form with the observed data may
be statistically tested with a generalization of the Box-Cox transformation.




λ / ) 1 ( − t y for λ ≠ 0 and denote ln(yt) for λ = 0.  Consider the general transformation-of-
variables function
(1)  () () () 2 1 0 λ λ λ γ β α y i m + + =  ,
where m denotes the real monetary base, i the interest rate, and y real income.  If we set λ0 = λ2 =
0 and  γ = –1 and multiply the equation by minus unity (that is, –1), we obtain (ignoring the sign
of the intercept) the velocity specification
(2) () () 1 ln
λ β α i v − = ,
where  ) / ( m y v = is monetary-base velocity.  When  0 1 = λ , the log-log form  ) ln (ln i v β α − =
arises; when  1 1 = λ , the log-level (semi-log) form  ) (ln i v β α − =  arises; and when  1 1 − = λ , the
log-inverse form  ) / (ln 1 i a a v + = arises.  If the velocity restriction (γ = –1) is relaxed such
that γ is unrestricted, the general transformation is
                                                     
19 See, for example, Judge et al. (1988) and Zarembka (1974). The usual Box-Cox transformation is a
special case of the above with only a single parameter,  λ λ λ λ = = = 2 1 0 .  Although various analyses
suggest that estimates of the Box-Cox transformation parameter λ are robust to departures from normality,
they also suggest that estimates may be biased toward values of λ that imply linearity if the data generating
process of the disturbance is heteroskedastic (Zarembka, 1974).13
(3) ) ln( ) ln(
1 y i a m γ β
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If 1 1 − = λ , then (1) becomes




+ + = .
Recursive estimates of β for the velocity-restricted model (2) are shown in Figures 9, 10 and 11
for three values of λ1: –1, 0, and 1; similar estimates of β and γ in (3), without the velocity
restriction, are shown in Figures 12, 13, and 14.  In each figure, the dashed line denotes a
recursion that begins with 10 years of data, 1919 to 1929, and adds one year of data to the end of
the period until achieving a span of 1919 to 1999. The solid line denotes a recursion that begins
with 1989–1999 and adds one year of data to the beginning of the period until achieving a span of
1919 to 1999. Comparing results, the successive estimated values of β and γ for the inverse-rate
specification, λ1 = – 1, settle down near their final values somewhat sooner than do estimates for
the other values of λ1. CUSUM and CUSUMSQ diagnostic statistics, with 95 percent confidence
bounds, also are shown in Figures 9 through 14.
20 The CUSUM statistics suggest that the inverse-
rate specification is superior to the semi-log and log-log specifications, both with and without the
velocity restriction. The CUSUMSQ statistics are inconclusive, with no model superior to the
others.
We conclude that the inverse-rate, velocity-restricted specification is at least as
compatible with the data as the other two alternatives.
Beyond recursive estimation for alternative (but fixed) values of λ1, equations (2) and (3)
suggest that β and γ may be considered as continuous functions of λ1, that is, as β(λ1) and γ(λ1).
Estimates of β(λ1) and γ(λ1) for the range ( 1 1 1 ≤ ≤ − λ ) are shown in Figure 15; the estimated
                                                     
20 Harvey (1981, pp. 151–2). The CUSUM statistic consists of partial sums of standardized recursive
residuals, where each residual is divided by the standard error of the regression. The CUSUMSQ statistic
consists of partial sums of the squares of recursive residuals, where each residual is divided by the
aggregate sum of squared residuals.14
coefficient on the corporate-bond default rate and the regression standard error also are shown.
Values of γ, the income-elasticity coefficient, remain near 1 for all values of λ1; values of the
other coefficients are quite sensitive to λ1 .  The residual standard error of the regression is
smallest for the log-inverse specification (λ1 = –1), as suggested by Figures 1, 2 and 3.
Overall, we conclude once more that the inverse-rate specification appears to be the best
fit to the data.
21
Besides β(λ1) and γ(λ1), the interest elasticity of monetary-base demand is a (nonlinear)
function of both the sample data (especially the interest rate) and λ1, denoted as η( λ1 , i).  The
three lines shown in Figure 16 examine interactions among the values of λ1 and the value of the
Aaa rate.  Let imin, imean , and imax denote the minimum, mean, and maximum values of the Aaa
bond rate during the sample period. Then, the three lines are: η( λ1 , imin), labeled “1”;
η( λ1 , imean), labeled “2”; and η( λ1 , imax), labeled “3.”  The value λ1 = 0  implies a log-log
constant-elasticity specification: η( λ1 , i) does not vary with i and, the three lines intersect at
η( λ1 , imean) ≅ -0.64.  Note that when λ1 ≠ 0 the cross-partial derivatives of η( λ1 , i) are strongly
non-zero, as illustrated by the difference between the lines labeled “1” and “3.”
Below, to simplify notation, we denote as η(i) the case where λ1  = –1, that is, the VECM
specified with the inverse of the interest rate.
Implications of Functional Form for Monetary Policy
Beyond pragmatic concerns regarding linearity and statistical stability, the choice of
functional form has implications for the formulation and conduct of monetary policy.  During the
                                                     
21 A reader asked why we did not examine more general tests for (non)linearity of regression functions, in
the context of money demand.  We offer two defenses.  First, such tests most often consider the null
hypothesis that f( ) is linear in the relationship w = f(x,y,z).  In our analysis, we consider the narrower
hypothesis that false rejection of the linearity of f( ), when f( ) is linear, may be due to an incorrect choice
of an interior, nested function.  That is, we consider the null hypothesis that there exists a function g(y),
possibly nonlinear, such that the linearity of  f(x, g(y), z) is not rejected. In our analysis, y is a market
interest rate or yield.  Second, the practice of testing for functional form does not remove inference15
1970s, when inflation and interest rates were “high,” many central banks embraced monetary
aggregates as intermediate policy guidelines.  During the 1990s, when inflation and interest rates
were relatively “low,” most of the same central banks abandoned monetary aggregates, citing the
“instability” of money demand.  Could there be a connection among the level of interest rates, the
functional form of the money demand curve, and the information content of monetary
aggregates?  Is it possible that the growth of monetary aggregates contains a relatively large
amount of information useful for monetary policy when interest rates are high and a relatively
small amount when interest rates are low?
Our functional form analysis suggests that this may be the case.  Consider the familiar Cagan
semi-log (that is, log-level) form.  In this model, the interest elasticity of money demand increases
with the level of interest rates: As money’s opportunity cost increases, households and firms
reduce their money holdings relative to income and spending—but the functional form says more.
It asserts that the ease with which agents substitute away from money increases as they reduce
their money holdings, that is, that the interest elasticity of money demand is an increasing
function of the level of interest rates.  From a microeconomic perspective, and assuming that at
least some money is held by households in general equilibrium, this seems contrary to the
diminishing marginal rate of substitution implicit in Inada conditions.  Similarly, when money’s
opportunity cost decreases because the central bank has achieved price stability, households and
firms likely will increase their money holdings relative to income and expenditure; but the Cagan
form asserts that this substitution against other assets becomes successively more difficult as
money’s opportunity cost decreases.  These implications of the Cagan functional form seem
unattractive.
In contrast, the inverse-rate functional form asserts that the ability of households and firms to
further reduce money holdings relative to income—that is, the interest elasticity of money
                                                                                                                                                             
problems regarding, for example, in what way the model might be nonlinear; nor does it solve issues16
demand—decreases as they reduce their money holdings.  Some monetary-policy models suggest
an inverse correlation between the monetary-policy information content of a monetary aggregate
and its elasticity relative to market interest rates, for two reasons.
22  First, a sustained change in
the growth of the aggregate is more likely to be indicative of a change in economic activity rather
than an adjustment to movements in market interest rates.  Second, market interventions by the
central bank that are intended to change short-term interests actions can, for a given desired
change in market rates, be smaller.  For these reasons, the underlying properties of a functional
form are important to any assessment of the monetary-policy role of monetary aggregates
(including the adjusted monetary base) regardless of any putative “instability” in the function.
A Structural VAR Interpretation
In this section, we provide a structural interpretation of our long-run monetary-base
velocity equation as a demand curve.  The analysis follows Rasche (2001), who extends the
identification schemes proposed by Bernanke (1986) and Sims (1986) to provide a simple,
consistent IV estimator of both the permanent and transitory shocks in an identified VECM
model. For a VAR model of size p with r cointegrating vectors, the procedure may be interpreted
in three steps. First, reorder the VECM such that the (p-r) equations that contain permanent
shocks are ordered above the r equations that contain transitory shocks. Identify the (p-r)
equations and their permanent shocks by imposing a Wold-like recursive structure and
interpreting the equations as a King, Plosser, Stock, and Watson (1991) common-trends model.
Next, impose normalization and exclusion restrictions on the r equations that contain the
transitory shocks (although other restrictions are feasible) to identify these equations. The
exclusion restrictions exclude some of the cointegrating vectors from the last r equations, and the
normalization restrictions specify a priori some of the coefficients in the matrix of
                                                                                                                                                             
regarding hypothesis testing with a fixed sample size (Hamilton, 2001).
22 Mishkin (1996).17
contemporaneous (simultaneous) interactions among the variables. Finally, use the estimated
identified permanent shocks as instrumental variables in estimation of the last r equations
containing the transitory shocks.
Let Xt be a (p × 1) vector of data series and define the reduced form VECM data
generating process for Xt as
(1)  t t t p LX X L I ε β α = ′ − ∆ Γ − )] ( [ ,
where the matricies  β α,  are (p × r) and Γ(L) is a matrix polynomial in the lag operator L.  Let
the moving average representation of the reduced-form data generating process be
(2)  t t t L C L C X ε ε ) ( ) 1 ( ) 1 (
* − + = ∆
with rank  r p C − = ) 1 ( .
First, following Sims (1986) and Bernanke (1986), assume that the shocks in the
underlying structural model are contemporaneously uncorrelated,  p I u = Σ , and that the
relationship between the shocks in the structural (“economic”) and reduced form (VECM) models
is of the form
(3) t t A Bu ε = .
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− , that is, that the function of W2 is to re-order the
model’s equations such that the cointegrating vectors appear in the last r equations of the
transformed model.
The identification problem stated in (3) cannot be resolved solely by covariance restrictions;
some restrictions must be placed on the parameters of the “economic” model.
23  Further, such
restrictions always, in some part, are arbitrary because a minimally sufficient set of restrictions
(that is, a set which gives exact identification) cannot be statistically tested.  With that caveat in
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 defines the contemporaneous (simultaneous)
relationships among the ∆Xt .
The restrictions imposed to this point are too few to identify the model. Numerous
alternative restrictions are possible. Normalizing each equation, for example, would be sufficient
to exactly identify the model. To discuss normalization, it is useful to consider separately the first
(p-r) and last r equations. For the former, normalizing the principal diagonal of  11 T  to unity is
                                                     
23 Identification via a Wold causal-chain structure requires both that the covariance matrix of the structural
shocks be diagonal and that the transformation matrix be lower-triangular (Fisher, 1966, ch. 4).  Fisher
(1966) shows that identification of a model, except for the case of a Wold causal chain, cannot be19
sufficient to identify the first (p-r) equations. With this restriction, the first (p-r) equations form a
King, Plosser, Stock and Watson (1991) “common trends” model.  Hence, this normalization
seems (to us) a very acceptable assumption.
What about the last r equations, the error-correction equations of the model that define the
transitory shocks?  Consider the matrix  22 T .  Above, we defined  22 T  as lower-triangular but
placed no restrictions on the r elements of its principal diagonal. Absent these restrictions, the
economic model is underidentified by r restrictions.  Often, the last r equations are normalized on
an element of the appropriate row of the matrix of contemporaneous (simultaneous) interactions
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V .  Then,  [ ] 22
1
11 21 2 T T B V H
− − =  defines r(r–1)/2 linear restrictions
on the elements of  2 H .  To complete exact identification of both the transitory shocks and the
dynamic structure of the last r equations in the “economic model,” we can impose r additional
linear restrictions (normalizations) of the form
0 2] [ r H vec R = ∗ .
This analysis focuses on a three-variable VECM model with a single cointegrating
vector.  Let 
’ X = {rAMB, rGNP, InverseBondRate, DefaultRate}, where rAMB and rGNP
denote the real adjusted monetary base and real gross national product, respectively. (Note that
the dimension of the VECM is three because the default rate is treated as exogenous.) Johansen’s
(1991) maximum-likelihood estimation procedure suggests one cointegrating vector, and hence
                                                                                                                                                             
accomplished solely with covariance restrictions. Identification always requires some, perhaps “incredible,”
restrictions on the structural coefficients of the model.20
the model has (p–r) = 2 permanent shocks.








0 . 1 0 . 0 0 . 0
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1 W , so that the common trends have unitary long-run (reduced form)
multipliers on real output and the inverse interest rate.  The selection matrix for the cointegrating











T .  Identification of
the third equation of the model is accomplished with a normalization restriction on the coefficient
of ∆rAMB in H2 (setting the coefficient to 1).
Instrumental variables estimates of the third equation of the VECM—the dynamic short-
run monetary-base demand curve—are shown in Table 2 both with and without the velocity
restriction in the cointegrating vector.
25  In statistical tests, the velocity restriction in the
cointegrating vector is not rejected; the Table makes clear that model estimates are robust with
respect to whether or not it is imposed. (In the cointegrating vector, the unrestricted coefficient
estimate on real GDP is 1.081.) The error-correction effect is significant, with a coefficient of –
0.5.  Strong simultaneity among current-period changes in the real adjusted monetary base, real
GNP, and the inverse bond yield also is apparent.
The distributed lags between the real adjusted monetary base and, in turn, real GNP and
the inverse bond rate are shown in Table 3.  In each case, the one-period lagged effect has the
opposite sign relative to the current period, with the sign again reversed in the second lagged
period.
                                                     
24 For the hypotheses that r = 0, r = 1, and r = 2, the values of the λ-max and trace (rank) statistics,
respectively, are 28.1, 15.7 and 0.44, and 44.1, 16.1, and 0.44. The corresponding ninety five–percent
critical values for the trace statistic are 34.8, 20.0, and 9.1.
25 Instruments used in the estimation include the estimated permanent shock from the first equation of the
model; the part of the second permanent shock that is orthogonal to the first permanent shock; one-period
lags of the change in the real adjusted monetary base, the change in real GNP, and the change in the inverse
bond rate; one-period lagged levels of the real adjusted monetary base, real GNP, and the inverse bond rate;
and, current and one-period lagged values of the change in the bond default rate.21
Impulse response functions (IRFs) are shown in Figures 17, 18, and 19 for the responses
of real output, the real monetary base, monetary-base velocity, and the level (not inverse) of the
interest rate to shocks in the inverse interest rate, the real monetary base, and real output. Only
IRFs for the velocity-restricted model are shown; IRFs for the model without the velocity
restriction are similar.
For each shock, the interest-rate IRF is a nonlinear transformation of the inverse interest-
rate IRF (which is the variable that appears in the model) and is calculated from the inverse
interest-rate IRF by the formulas shown in appendix B.  As previously discussed, the interest
elasticity of money demand is a nonlinear function of the level of the interest rate. Hence, the
calculations necessarily depend on the initial conditions, that is, the initial level of the interest
rate. To illustrate the potential range of outcomes, for each of the three shocks we conducted three
calculations of the interest-rate IRF. One calculation sets the interest rate at the lowest value
observed in our sample, that is, the highest interest elasticity of monetary-base demand. Another
sets the rate at the highest observed interest rate (lowest interest elasticity), and the third sets the
interest rate at its sample mean. For the case of the (inverse) interest rate shock, the three interest-
rate IRFs are normalized such that the long-run change in the interest rate (after 45 periods) is the
same.
Overall, the IRFs suggest that the VECM is sensible and well behaved. In Figure 17, a
permanent positive unit shock to the inverse of the interest-rate induces a rapid fall in the level of
the interest rate, an increase in the real monetary base, and a decrease in real output. The impact
effect on the interest rate is an inverse function of the initial level of the interest rate; that is, the
initial decrease in the interest rate is relatively larger if the initial interest rate is relatively low (or
equivalently the interest-elasticity of monetary-base demand is relatively large). For real output
and the real monetary base, the sizes of the impact effects are positively related to η(i) with the
change for the lowest elasticity being several times greater than the change for the largest.
Overall, the money-demand response is that a sharp, permanent decrease in the interest rate leads22
to an increase in monetary-base demand and lower velocity, with no long-run effect on real
output. The short-run decrease in real output is puzzling, although output fairly promptly returns
to its previous level.
 26
Figure 18 shows the effects of a permanent positive unit-size real-output shock: The real
monetary base increases and velocity falls, but the effect on the interest rate is ambiguous. As
expected, the long-run interest-rate change depends on the initial conditions. If the interest rate
initially is relatively high (and, hence, the interest elasticity of monetary-base demand relatively
small), then the interest rate response (IRF) is near zero throughout.  If the interest rate initially is
relatively low (and the interest elasticity of monetary-base demand relatively large), the long-run
level of the interest rate may be lower than the initial level; if the initial level of the interest rate is
near its sample mean, the long-run level of the interest rate may be higher than the initial level.
Figure 19 shows the effect of a unit shock to the real monetary base. The impact effects
on real output and velocity are negative, and both are unchanged in the long run.  The impact on
the interest rate varies sharply with the initial interest elasticity, but the effect diminishes quickly
and rates are unchanged in the long run.
Summary and Conclusion
  The putative nonexistence of stable money-demand functions is often cited as an
established fact in monetary economics.  For 80 years of observations on the Federal Reserve
Bank of St. Louis adjusted monetary base, we find a well-defined stable demand function. Our
analysis suggests that demand for the monetary base may be modeled as demand for a zero-
coupon, default risk–free consol.
We find that a demand curve specified in terms of the inverse of a long-term low default-
risk interest rate is found to be more consistent with the data than log-log or semi-log
                                                     
26 Given the typically wide width of confidence intervals for IRFs, it is likely that these responses are not
statistically different.23
specifications. An important aspect of the inverse-rate specification is that the interest elasticity of
money demand is a decreasing function of the level of interest rates; that is, successive
substitutions away from money become increasingly difficult as the level of interest rates
increases. Such a specification is consistent with popular general equilibrium models that include
cash-in-advance constraints and/or suggest a demand for money in general equilibrium.
In the context of an identified VECM model, we estimated a dynamic short-run demand
function for the monetary base. Strong, statistically significant, positive interactions are estimated
among changes in the real monetary base, real output, and the inverse interest rate. Lagged
variables are not statistically significant except for the cointegrating vector, suggesting a strong
“pull” from any short-run disequilibrium toward the long-run equilibrium defined by the
cointegrating vector.
Our results suggest that growth of the monetary base, at least at the relatively low
frequency of annual data, can provide guidance for monetary policymakers, particularly when
inflation or the level of nominal interest rates is high.24
Appendix A: Data
The data used in this analysis are annual figures from 1919 to 1999.
27  The adjusted
monetary base data for 1919–1999 are from Anderson and Rasche (1999, 2001).  Real GNP and
GNP price-index data for 1919–1946 are from Balke and Gordon (1986). These data are chained
to the Bureau of Economic Analysis quarterly GDP data at the first quarter of 1947. The nominal
interest rate data are the long-term corporate Aaa rate or the Baa rate. Both are available at a
monthly frequency for the entire sample period.
Data on bond down-ratings are from Hickman (1960) for 1919–1943, extended to 1965 by
Atkinson (1967), and are the same as used by Temin (1976, p. 81, Table 10).  Data on bond
defaults for 1919–1943 are from Hickman (1960) and Atkinson (1967, p. 44, Table 17, column
1).  Data on outstanding amounts of bonds are from Hickman (1960) prior to 1944 and from
Atkinson (1967, p. 49, Table 21) for 1944–1965. Default rates in these data, as a percentage of
beginning-of-year stocks, averaged 1.0 percent per year during the 1920s, 3.2 percent during the
1930s, 0.4 percent during the 1940s, 0.04 during the 1950s, and 0.03 percent for 1960–1965. We
assume an annual default rate of zero from 1966 to 1999, consistent with data available on the
Internet from Moody’s Investor Services.
For bond down-ratings, our calculations suggest that Temin’s Table 10 is in error: the “Net
Upgrading” amounts he reports apparently are too small by a factor of 10. Consider as an
example the figures for 1932.  Temin’s table shows beginning-of-year “Total Bonds Outstanding
(billions of dollars)” as $29.1 billion. This agrees with Hickman.  But, Temin reports net
upgrading of category I and II bonds as –$339 and –$305 million, respectively, or –1.17 and
–1.05 percent of the initial outstanding stock. Our calculations show –$3.39 and –$3.05 billion, or
–11.7 and –10.5 percent of the initial outstanding stock.
                                                     
27 We have performed the same analysis with quarterly data and obtained closely similar results. Bond
default data are available only annually, however.25
Appendix B: The IRF for  the Level of the Interest Rate
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Appendix C:  Effect of Foreign Holdings of U.S. Currency
In recent years, a great deal of U.S. currency has been exported to foreign countries. Because
the monetary base currently is approximately 90 percent currency, changes in foreign-held
currency are potentially important to our modeling. A number of authors have presented estimates
of the amount of currency abroad, including Porter and Judson (1996), Bach (1997), and
Anderson and Rasche (1997, 2000). Each author estimates the amount of currency held broad by
assuming an initial benchmark amount and accumulating subsequent flows. Lacking adequate
data for years before the mid-1970s, early studies (Porter and Judson, Bach) assumed as an initial
benchmark that approximately half of U.S. currency was held abroad as of the mid-1970s. Based
on data beginning in 1965, Anderson and Rasche (1997) argued that these initial benchmarks
were far too large.
In this Appendix, we take estimates of foreign-held U.S. currency from the Federal Reserve’s
Flow of Funds accounts. These data are constructed from an initial benchmark that no U.S.
currency was held abroad as of year-end 1963. This is very similar to the benchmark of Anderson
and Rasche (1997) who assume that no currency was held abroad as of year-end 1964. The Flow
of Funds figures increase from $3.8 billion held abroad at year-end 1964 to $254.6 billion at year-
end 1999. Subtracting these amounts from the monetary base yields a rough estimate of the
“domestic” monetary base. Figures A1, A2, and A3 show the log velocity of the domestic
monetary base versus, respectively, the inverse of the Aaa bond rate, the Aaa bond rate, and the
log of the Aaa bond rate. Note that the subtraction affects only points in the left-hand third of
Figure A1; points to the right of this area reflect the relatively lower interest rates before 1964. In
Figure A1, the scatter for the inverse-rate model clearly differs less, relative to Figure 3, than the
other models differ relative to Figures 1 and 2. We conclude that our analysis of 80 years of data
likely is not significantly affected by currency exports in recent years.27
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Table 1:  Estimated Linear Regressions using the Adjusted Monetary Base and the Aaa bond rate
(1919-1999)
Dependent variable:  GDP velocity of the adjusted monetary base













OLS –3.631 –0.032 -- 0.144
DOLS (2 leads, 2 lags) –3.606 –0.034 -- 0.115
OLS –3.622 –0.030 –0.0004 0.090
DOLS (1 lead, 1 lag) –3.606 –0.031 –0.0003 0.082
FIML -- –0.031 –0.0000
Η
Dependent variable:  Deflated adjusted monetary base



















OLS 4.490 0.903 0.027 -- 0.131
DOLS (2 leads, 2 lags) 3.892 0.970 0.032 -- 0.091
OLS 3.452 1.019 0.031 0.0004 0.090
DOLS (1 lead, 1 lag) 3.227 1.044 0.034 0.0003 0.073
FIML -- 1.069 0.033 0.0000
Η
                                                     
Η Coefficient estimates rounds to this value.31
Table 2:  Parameter Estimates of the Identified VECM
Sample: 1921-1997, annual data







































a:) from the reduced-form VECM estimated using Johansen’s FIML estimator,














829 . 0 082 . 0 243 . 0
442 . 0 976 . 0 577 . 0
337 . 2 778 . 0 448 . 1
) 1 ( C
b:) from the reduced-form VECM estimated using Johansen’s FIML estimator,














841 . 0 079 . 0 252 . 0
547 . 0 950 . 0 681 . 0
050 . 2 707 . 0 460 . 1
) 1 ( C32
Table 3:  Implicit Distributed Lag Coefficients in Identified VECM
 (including error-correction term)
Without velocity restriction With velocity restriction




























































0 . 00 . 51 . 01 . 52 . 02 . 53 . 0























Aaa rate Amsler consol PCGA
Amsler consol rate, PCGA current yield, and Aaa bond yield







Aaa rate Amsler consol PCGA
Inverses of Amsler consol rate, PCGA current yield, and Aaa bond yield
















































Defaults on Investment-Grade Corporate Bonds
New Defaults
millions of dollars











new defaults as percentage of bonds outstanding
















































































0 5 10 15 20 25 30



































Log of Monetary Base Velocity (adjusted for defaults)
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Inverse-rate model with velocity restriction

































Semi-log model with velocity restriction
































Log-log model with velocity restriction

































Inverse-rate model without velocity restriction










































Semi-log model without velocity restriction











































Log-log model without velocity restriction













































Box-Cox Transformation on Aaa Rate Variable
Annual Data 1919 - 1997
Income Elasticity Estimates
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Aaa Rate Coefficient Estimates
lambda








Default Rate Coefficient Estimates
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Impulse Response Functions, Inverse Interest Rate Shock
model with velocity restriction
Real Output
















































Impulse Response Functions, Real Output Shock
model with velocity restriction
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Impulse Response Functions, Real Monetary-Base Shock
model with velocity restriction
Real Output



















































Log of Domestic Monetary-Base Velocity and Inverse Aaa Bond Rate
Annual 1919-1999
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